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Jeremy Bentham is known as the founder of classical utilitarianism, and as a profound analyser
and theorist of law. Occasionally, he is also mentioned (though for the most part fleetingly) as
among the thinkers who contributed to the development of economics as a discipline. Insofar as
the homo ecomomicus of modern economics is assumed to be a self-interested utility maximizer,
Bentham would recognize his own characterization of typical human motivation (provided only
that utility was understood as a net balance of pleasure over pain). However, he also recognized
that, in seeking to maximize their own utility, human beings often make mistakes, through laziness
or lack of time, overhasty associations of ideas, or desire to think and act like their fellows. In the
English-speaking world at least, the previous sentence will be instantly recognizable as a summary
of the findings of behavioural economics in general, and the nudge theory of Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein in particular.1 Unfortunately for Bentham, he never published the material in
which he most fully developed his insights into the obstacles to rational choosing, and to the
range of possible governmental responses to both those obstacles and to the failures of rationality
to which they give rise. That work, Bentham’s essay on ‘Indirect Legislation’, is the topic of this
special issue.
The origin of Bentham’s writings on indirect legislation lies in his efforts to complete his most
famous work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,2 almost all of which
was printed in 1780, although the work was not published until 1789. He decided that the distinction
between penal and civil law required a brief explanation, and set out to provide one, only to find that
this separation could scarcely be said as yet to exist: and that to set up one of my own in such manner as
to answer as nearly as possible the purposes for which the verbal distinction is made, would involve a
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multitude of problems of the most intricate kind which nobody seem’d hitherto to have thought of
solving.3
The product of this inquiry was Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, which
quickly expanded to the length of a volume, and contains the fullest statement of Bentham’s theory
of law, and the development and exposition of his logic of the will.4 Bentham planned and drafted
two further additional Chapters for IPML, namely ‘Indirect Legislation’ and ‘Place and Time’,
which concerned respectively ‘the several ways of preventing misdeeds otherwise than by (force
of) punishment immediately applied to the very act which is obnoxious’,5 and the ‘influence of
time and place on the expediency of a law. Some parts of a perfect body of law will be equally
adapted to all times and places: others not’.6 Neither of these essays, written in 1782, has yet
appeared in the Collected Works, although a preliminary text of ‘Place and Time’ appeared in
2011.7
Bentham neither completed nor published his essay on ‘Indirect Legislation’, which, like Limits,
expanded to voluminous proportions. However, writing in French, he returned to discussion of
indirect legislation in the mid-1780s when drafting another work which was later to be abandoned
unfinished, namely ‘Projet d’un corps de loix complet’.8 Some or all of these two bodies of
manuscripts were utilized by Bentham’s Genevan friend and editor Étienne Dumont,9 who pro-
duced a version of the material in the third volume of his recension Traités de législation civile et
pénale,10 published in 1802, a work which succeeded in establishing for Bentham a considerable
reputation on the continent as a political writer of note. Forty years later, after Bentham’s death,
large parts of the Traités were retranslated for inclusion in the 11 volume Bowring edition of
Bentham’s collected works,11 and Dumont’s version of ‘Indirect Legislation’ appeared in the
first volume.12
Neither Bentham’s unpublished English essay ‘Indirect Legislation’ nor the published versions of
Dumont’s recensions of it attracted very much interest from interpreters of Bentham’s thought until
the second half of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the ground-breaking contribution of Bru-
non-Ernst below, indirect legislation makes no explicit appearance in the 33 volumes of the Collected
Works of J.S. Mill, or in Sidgwick’sMethods of Ethics. Similarly, it is not discussed in either Stephen’s
English Utilitarians,13 or Albee’sHistory of English Utilitarianism,14 and receives only a passing men-
tion in Halevy’s Growth of Philosophic Radicalism.15 Even C.K. Ogden, who edited and published an
3Bentham to Lord Ashburton, June 3, 1782, The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, Volume III., ed. I.R. Christie (London, 1971
(CWJB)), 121–30, at 123.
4Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield (Oxford, 2010 (CWJB)). Limits first appeared as The Limits of Jur-
isprudence Defined, ed. C.W. Everett (New York, 1945), before being edited for the Collected Works by H.L.A. Hart as Of Laws in
General (London, 1970), and re-edited by Schofield in 2010.
5Bentham to Ashburton, Correspondence (CWJB) III. 127.
6Ibid.
7‘Place and Time’, ed. P. Schofield and S.G. Engelmann, in Jeremy Bentham: Selected Writings, ed. S.G. Engelmann (New Haven &
London, 2011), 152–219.
8The following full title of this projected work appears at University College London collection of Bentham manuscripts (henceforth
UC) xcix. 156: ‘Projet d’un corps de loix complet, à l’usage d’un pays quelconque: avec les principes et les raisons tant générales
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15See Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (first published at Paris, 1901) (London, 1928), 78–9, 145.
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English version of Dumont’s Traités in 1931,16 and thus republished ‘Of Indirect Means of Prevent-
ing Crimes’, included no discussion of, indeed no reference at all to, indirect legislation in his
introduction.
No editorial work was undertaken on Bentham’s English draft of ‘Indirect Legislation’ until the
late 1970s, when Charles F. Bahmueller at the Bentham Project prepared a draft text, consisting
in a Preface, a Plan cum Introduction, 19 Chapters, a Conclusion, and nine Appendices. Further
work on the text and notes was undertaken in the early 1980s by Frederick Rosen, Stephen Conway
and Claire Gobbi. The successive eddies and currents of the funding environment within which the
Bentham Project has always operated (and continues to operate) have meant that neither time nor
money has yet been available to complete the work which Bahmueller started. Until money and time
become available for further editorial work, however, this text is the best available for scholars
interested in Bentham’s exposition of indirect legislation, as expounded in his native language. In
recognition of this fact, and with grateful acknowledgement to the work of Bahmueller, the contri-
butors to this special issue were equipped with this draft text, with no new editorial intervention
beyond checking the draft text against the original transcripts for accuracy. We are, however, very
happy to report that the manuscripts containing Bentham’s essay ‘Indirect Legislation’ are now
open to public view (and hopefully public transcription) via the platform of the award-winning
crowd-sourcing initiative Transcribe Bentham, administered by the Bentham Project at UCL.17
The first scholar to study the manuscripts of Bentham’s English draft of the essay in depth, and to
publish her discussion, was Mary Mack. Mack’s indictment of the lack of attention previously
accorded to indirect legislation was trenchant: ‘The total neglect of these manuscripts is mystifying
and deplorable, for next to the logic of the will itself, they may well be his most original contribution
to the history of thought.’18 For her own part, she first made the effort to integrate indirect legislation
into Bentham’s theory of law, and second devoted an extensive discussion to an analysis of the
essay.19 Mack also foreshadows two of the issues which arise in relation to indirect legislation, antici-
pating on the one hand those who see indirect legislation as Bentham’s ideal form of law, intended in
the long run, through mobilization of the moral sanction, to supersede coercive law,20 and advancing
on the other a hypothesis to explain the apparent disappearance of the concept from Bentham’s leg-
islative tool-box.21 Neither thesis is completely convincing, but Mack should be credited with an
astute identification of some of the most important issues.
Perhaps inspired by Mack’s investigation, Douglas Long also analysed Bentham’s essay on ‘Indir-
ect Legislation’.22 Long sensibly treated the essay together with ‘Place and Time’, also drafted in con-
tinuation of IPML. Long also draws attention to the interaction between the political and moral
sanctions, and notes Bentham’s discussion of indirect means of preventing misrule. Like Engelmann
in this issue, he stresses Bentham’s attachment to ‘the right of arming and association’, and his denial
that these rights pose a threat to the existence of government.23 L.J. Hume also used ‘Indirect Legis-
lation’ to good effect in developing his original interpretation of Bentham’s theory of law and its
application to all aspects of state behaviour: ‘Government could only be accounted for and analysed
16J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation (New York, 1931). Ogden used as the basis of his text Richard Hildreth’s translation of the Traités,
first published as Theory of Legislation, 2 vols (Boston, 1840).
17http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/transcribe-bentham/. The manuscripts in question are in boxes lxxxvii (87), lxii (62), xcvi (96) and xcix (99).
18M. Mack, Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas, 1748–1792 (London, 1962), 174n.
19See ibid., 170–5, 291–327.
20See ibid., 292–3.
In the ‘transcendental’ future, the good legislator will have provided for basic physical needs and subsistence for all, abol-
ished the irrational and frightening religious sanctions, and sought in every way to minimize his own professional judicial
and legislative operations. In that ideal time, the moral sanction will have replaced the political. Men would choose to
behave well because they understood utilitarian rationales, not because their wills were coerced by threats of punishment.
21See ibid., 326: ‘When Bentham laid aside his chapters on Indirect Legislation he began a new age of compromise. He no longer
ran from a good thing to a better; he now retreated from the best to the possible.’
22D.G. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham’s Idea of Liberty in Relation to His Utilitarianism (Toronto, 1977), 135–49.
23See ibid., 144–5, citing ‘Indirect Legislation’, UC lxxxvii. 119–20.
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in legal terms, and the established body of legal analysis could easily be extended to cover any aspect
of the state.’24 Hume also brought out the focus of ‘Indirect Legislation’ on ‘the techniques of gov-
ernment, the means of establishing social control’, and, developing a theme picked up by Marciniak
in this issue, concluded that Bentham’s essay was ‘a sort of manual of preventive police’.25 Informed
by his editorial work on ‘Indirect Legislation’, Bahmueller made use of Bentham’s discussion of indi-
gence in the essay in his analysis of Bentham’s poor law writings.26 Thereafter, little attention was
paid to the subject until Stephen Engelmann’s seminal article of 2003,27 which prompted a renewed
interest, and was quickly followed in 2005 by Christian Laval’s ‘La chaîne invisible’.28 Laval rightly
paid tribute to Engelmann’s contribution in his own article, which, notwithstanding its exclusive
reliance on Dumont’s version of the text, has been equally influential. The editors are grateful to
him for allowing the excellent translation by Helen Tomlinson, and to Emmanuelle de Champs, edi-
tor of the Revue d’études benthamiennes, for permitting the republication of the article in this issue,29
which will finally make it accessible to students in English. In France, several scholars have built on
Laval’s pioneering work,30 while in Japan Bentham’s readiness to use public power in manipulating
environments to good ends has been widely noted and defended, for instance, by Itai.31 In England,
by contrast, perhaps because of Hart’s focus on Bentham’s theory of law as command, there has been
very little work on the subject.32 In their introductions to Bentham both Dinwiddy and Crimmins do
discuss Indirect Legislation, but only very briefly,33 while the subject does not merit an entry in the
most recent encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.34
Notwithstanding the very limited attention so far paid to Bentham’s writings on indirect legis-
lation, many provocative questions arise in relation to them, some of which are directly treated in
this special issue. Among the questions which might be posed are ‘What is the relationship between
direct and indirect legislation, and what is the place of the latter in Bentham’s theory of law and his
art and science of legislation?’; ‘What is the explanation of the apparent disappearance of the term
indirect legislation from Bentham’s vocabulary after about 1790, and does it involve the rejection of
the concept – as well as the term – from his legislator’s toolbox?’; ‘To what extent does Bentham’s
indirect legislation pre-figure the nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein?’; ‘Is Bentham open to charges
of dissimulation, and of seeking to manipulate a public opinion unconscious of its manipulation?’;
and, finally, ‘Does the alleged esotericism of indirect legislation directly contradict Bentham’s oft-
repeated commitments to transparency in the exercise of public power?’ It is our view that Bentham’s
writings on indirect legislation raise issues which go to the heart of the task of interpreting his
thought on the one hand, and which remain at the centre of thinking about law and politics in
our own time on the other. The contributions to this issue by no means purport to resolve all
these questions, but it is our hope that they will stimulate others to revisit them (and these writings),
and help to facilitate both original thinking and a collegiate exchange of ideas and arguments, and
thus make a small contribution to their resolution.35
24L.J. Hume, Bentham and Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1981), 77.
25Ibid., 96, 97.
26C.F. Bahmueller, The National Charity Company: Jeremy Bentham’s Silent Revolution (Berkeley, 1981).
27S.G. Engelmann, ‘“Indirect Legislation”: Bentham’s Liberal Government’, Polity 35 (2003): 369–88.
28C. Laval, ‘La chaîne invisible: Bentham et le néolibéralisme’, Revue d’études benthamiennes 1 (2006).
29See 34–52 below.
30See, for example, M. Bozzo-Rey, ‘Le droit comme système de contrôle social: La question des normes chez Bentham et Foycault’,
Revue d’études benthamiennes 8 (2011); A. Brunon-Ernst, Utilitarian Biopolitics: Bentham, Foucault and Modern Power (London,
2012).
31See, for instance, H. Itai, A. Inoue, and S. Kodama, ‘Rethinking Nudge: Libertarian paternalism and classical utilitarianism’, Tocque-
ville Review/La revue Tocqueville 37 (2016): 81–98.
32‘Indirect Legislation’ is not discussed, for instance, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford,
1982).
33J. Dinwiddy, Bentham (Oxford, 1989), 30, 90–1; J. Crimmins, On Bentham (Toronto, 2004), 62–4.
34The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, ed. J.E. Crimmins (London, 2013).
35David Lieberman, the quality of whose scholarship is exceeded only by that of his generosity of spirit, agreed to contribute an
article discussing the relationship between indirect legislation and codification, but has been unable to do so because of a serious
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Several developments make this the perfect time to bring together the contributions of different
scholars to a special issue on ‘Indirect Legislation’. On the one hand, the impact of the ‘Nudge’ is
too pervasive to need comment. In different ways, Engelmann, Brunon-Ernst and Bozzo-Rey tackle
the issues of the extent to which Bentham anticipated nudge, and of what might hemake of the charge
that the subtle manipulation of individual preferences to improve outcomes is fundamentally illiberal.
On the other, there can be no doubt that the focus of ‘Indirect Legislation’ is preventive. As Marciniak
brings out in her contribution, a vigorous debate rages over the legitimacy of preventive measures, in
terms of health, in terms of climate change, and, above all, in terms of security and counter-terrorism.
1. Summaries of the articles in this special issue
In Bentham’s works, indirect legislation is embedded in his art of legislation and has complex
relationships with what he calls direct legislation. The special issue opens with an article by Michael
Quinn, which unravels some of the complexities of Bentham’s legal theory, and in so doing makes
subtle distinctions between Bentham’s indirect legislation and Nudges.
Quinn’s starting point is the normative nature of direct legislation. The role of the legislator is to
identify pain-producing actions which demand a response in the form of deterrent sanctions, them-
selves consisting in pains, the justification of which rests in the exclusion of ‘some greater evil’. As
Bentham seeks to minimize the mischief of pain, the infliction of legal punishment can be under-
stood as a failure of penal laws to act as effective tools for crime prevention. Quinn points to
some formulations in Bentham which imply that non-penal modes of law-making and of prompting
compliance should be promoted. These modes involve a shift in the legislative focus, insofar as direct
legislation acts on the interests or inclinations (that is the will) of the potential offender, while many
indirect legislation initiatives (such as the creation of accessory offences) operate on the interest,
knowledge and power of persons other than the potential perpetrator of the principal offence
(thus the indirect nature of indirect legislation). Bentham also makes the distinction between the
legislator’s primary and the secondary wills (with the latter being contained in subsidiary or adjective
laws, and being used in the delivery of penal sanctions in enforcement of the former). Thus Quinn
demonstrates that many expedients categorized by Bentham as indirect legislation are simul-
taneously exercises of direct legislation. Beyond the complexities of legal theory, the appeal of indir-
ect legislation lies in its focus on knowledge, rather than on interest or power, thus contributing to
the elimination of asymmetries of knowledge between potential offenders and potential victims by
providing official standards and factual information.
The seemingly consistent distinctions built by Bentham break apart when Quinn investigates par-
ticular initiatives, such as taxes and self-executing laws, which challenge the above-mentioned dis-
tinction between direct and indirect legislation. The latter might mobilize the force of the moral
sanction, where the former works through the force of the legal sanction. In doing so, indirect legis-
lation imposes on the Legislator a duty to appeal to people’s understanding through arguments and
education, while at the same time undercutting the monopoly role of her legislative will by turning
opinion-formers into potential legislators. However, Quinn warns us that if all communications of
will by government were construed as indirect legislation, this would extend the concept to encom-
pass practically everything that governments do, thus depriving it of much of its usefulness in nor-
mative analysis of law. Quinn then raises the issue of the use of the ‘secret art of governing opinion’
displayed in certain measures of indirect legislation, and asks whether such strategies conflict with
Bentham’s commitment to transparency. He concludes with the following statement:
On the one hand, the objective, rationalist, Enlightenment Bentham wants to focus on improvement by com-
munication of truth, of facts, between understanding and understanding. On the other, the subjective and, to be
self-consciously anachronistic, ‘post-modern’ Bentham, aware of both the constructivist nature of the world
road accident. The editors, together with the other contributors and the entire community of Bentham scholars, would like to
extend their warm wishes for a speedy recovery.
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created by human imagination, and of the weaknesses of human rational and cognitive processes, entertains the
manipulation of popular will by the manipulation of popular perceptions.
Quinn’s opening paper, by analysis of the unpublished manuscripts, provides a clear and subtle pres-
entation of the workings of indirect legislation in Bentham, and thus sets the stage for the further
discussions in this issue of the later (conscious or unconscious) re-appropriations of the concept
by J.S. Mill, Michel Foucault, contemporary theorists of prevention, and Thaler and Sunstein.
Christian Laval’s seminal paper is published here in English for the first time. It has had a major
influence among Francophone Bentham scholars, because it highlights the way in which Foucault’s
interest in Bentham extended far beyond the concept of panopticism, and gives a prominent position
to the workings of indirect legislation as a biopolitical tool.36 Laval starts by briefly reviewing the
conflicting representations of Bentham as either an ultra-liberal or as an inveterate social organizer
in political theory, a contrast also drawn later in this issue by Stephen Engelmann and Angela
Marciniak. Laval sets out to demonstrate that these interpretive categories ‘miss the essential
point when it comes to examining Bentham’s relationship to classical liberalism and contemporary
neo-liberalism’. His starting point is utilitarian government as the government of interests, under
which individuals form and pursue their own ends or interests in a context which government
needs to organize. This is what Foucault calls the utilitarian approach to liberalism. Bentham
describes this new form of government as an ‘invisible chain’, that is an invisible, anonymous,
permanent and regular power.
As rights and duties can only be imposed in a hierarchized political society, there is no such thing
as ‘natural liberty’, but only a system of laws which creates both security from encroachment by
others on the one hand, and security against abuse of power by the holders of political power on
the other. This can only be done by facilitating the formation, recognition and pursuit of individual
interests with a view to the underlying human psychological dynamic of real or imaginary pleasures
and pains. In that the governing of interests is enmeshed in the language used to describe them, the
legislator also needs to reform language in the direction of a neutral and dispassionate description of
real entities. All this paves the way for individuals to calculate their interests. The Legislator must
both understand how interests are formed, and exercise influence over their formation. Her actions
must guarantee the stability of expectations needed for the production of individual and social well-
being. Laval seizes on Bentham’s motto ‘Be quiet’, which is used in his writings on political economy,
to exemplify his guidance to legislators in the economic field.
With a view to Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics, Laval then develops the concept of government as
‘arrangement’, through the distinction between direct and indirect legislation. Indirect legislation
becomes a ‘preventative tactic’ which approaches interest obliquely to rule desires and prevent ancil-
lary offences. Bentham’s art of government thus does not aim to repress desires, but to divert them
through specific initiatives and techniques. Foucault named this new genre of politics ‘biopolitics’.
Looking at the ways in which unprofitable short-term desires are re-channelled in the market or
in the management of the poor, as well as the notorious measures to facilitate identification of indi-
viduals which are devised by Bentham, Laval expands on the phrase ‘invisible chain’, which he inter-
prets as the product of several elements: laws guaranteeing security, the visibility afforded to the acts
of all individuals, the consequent predictability of the outcomes of the actions of both agents them-
selves and of others, and – in a pre-choice-architecture framework – the constellation (or concatena-
tion, to use a Benthamic term) of circumstances and sources of influence which constitutes the
environment in which decisions are made. Bentham’s art of government is thus ‘a radically
de-individualized and disembodied power’ which expands beyond the scope of the panoptic eye
of surveillance into mechanisms of mutual control in society as a whole, where the people are
both the observers and the observed, and reciprocally keep in check each and everyone’s interest.
36Laval’s contribution was written a decade ago, before Bentham’s writings on indirect legislation were made more readily avail-
able thanks to the Bentham Project’s Transcribe Bentham platform: see note 17 above. His references are therefore to Dumont’s
Traités, rather than to the manuscript sources.
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In his contribution, Laval establishes Bentham as a pivotal author, taking his interpretation of uti-
litarian government a step further than Foucault, by stressing the unique mechanisms of indirect
legislation, which the author of The Birth of Biopolitics had tentatively identified in Bentham’s writ-
ings on political economy. As Quinn notes in his discussion, political economy is a field which exem-
plifies the contradictions at work in the distinction between direct and indirect legislation. Laval also
shows the importance of indirect legislation in challenging any interpretation which places Bentham
on either side of a false dichotomy between liberals on the one hand, and advocates of state inter-
vention on the other, since the mechanisms of indirect legislation straddle the alleged divide in build-
ing a new governmental rationality.
Anne Brunon-Ernst’s contribution moves both backwards – from the current debates over the
‘nudge-phenomenon’ – in search of the philosophical foundations of ‘behaviourally informed initiat-
ives’, and forwards, from Bentham’s original discussion of indirect legislation, in search of its influ-
ence on J.S. Mill. She begins by reviewing the impact of behavioural sciences on public policy, and
introducing in particular both the nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein, and the critiques to which it
has been subjected on the grounds of its conscious interference in, and manipulation of, individual
decision-making. She notes the ‘strategic’ use made of J.S. Mill as a theorist of liberty by both critics
and proponents of nudging, and finds the interpretations of Mill harm principle advanced by the
latter deeply flawed. She considers some of the inconsistencies and tensions in Mill’s own develop-
ment of the principle, and notes that Bentham, the explicit maximizer of happiness, seems intuitively
a rather better fit than Mill with the aims and methods of nudge. Brunon-Ernst explores this hypoth-
esis via an examination of the extent to which Mill was familiar with Bentham’s writings on indirect
legislation, before presenting her arresting central thesis, which is that ‘Mill’s Harm Principle, and,
more particularly, his subtle application of it in Chapter 5 of On Liberty is in effect a discussion of
Bentham’s use of indirect legislation’. She argues, that is, that behind the scenes Mill is engaging in an
intellectual exchange with the spirit of Bentham concerning the limits and appropriate means of state
intervention in individual decision-making. She shows that Bentham and Mill held identical atti-
tudes to the sale of poisons, and for identical reasons, but that differences emerge when the compari-
son is broadened to include such issues as the taxation of alcohol and other ‘sin’ goods, and the
provision of education to both children and, more strikingly, adults. She encapsulates the core differ-
ence between the two thinkers as follows: ‘Mill’s theory of government interference is negative, to
prevent harm, whereas Bentham’s intervention is both positive and negative, allowing positive inter-
ventions to promote happiness.’ She concludes that they differ over what value to assign to active,
reflective choosing, which for Mill is crucial to self-development, but for Bentham has, at best, an
instrumental value. For this reason, it is indeed Bentham, rather than Mill, who seems the more
ready (and sometimes eager) to sacrifice risk-laden individual self-determination to the maximiza-
tion of socially conforming happiness; and thus it is Bentham, rather than Mill, who might provide
the interventionist philosophical legacy behind nudge.
Stephen Engelmann’s contribution undertakes a sustained comparison between Bentham’s indir-
ect legislation and the ‘Liberal-Paternalism’ of Sunstein and Thaler. Engelmann argues that nudge is
fully compatible with, indeed is a species of, indirect legislation, and rejects superficial conflicts
between the two approaches derived from their alleged differences either in focus (criminality for
the former, prudence for the latter), or in degree of confidence in everyday human rationality (spe-
ciously deemed close to absolute in the former, and consistently low in the latter). Along the way,
Engelmann draws attention to Bentham’s deployment of many of the apparent failures in human
cognitive functioning which, having been rediscovered by behavioural economics, constitute the cen-
tral prescriptive core of nudge theory.
However, although the essay cogently uncovers significant similarities between the two theories,
its climax consists in a sustained exhortation to a parallel rediscovery of the political dimension of
human life, which Engelmann argues might be no less attractive than familiar to Bentham, but which
might well be close to unintelligible to his modern heirs. For Engelmann, Sunstein and Thaler are
‘Benthamites, but Benthamites with a difference’, while that difference consists in Bentham’s
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commitment to the vital importance of a political sphere in which human agents collectively con-
struct, contest and develop the conditions in which they live. It is argued that Liberal Paternalism
not only devalues politics, but comes perilously close to setting it aside altogether, by framing all
decisions as questions of self-referential prudence, and thus diagnosing every evil as the product
of individual cognitive failure, and prescribing treatment by nudges to facilitate better individual
choices. In making this case, Engelmann makes good use of Bentham’s repeated appeals in ‘Indirect
Legislation’ to what is recognizably a notion of republican virtue, ‘understood – as Bentham under-
stands it – as the spirit of collective action’. The essay closes with an urgent warning that the apparent
economization of human motives in Liberal Paternalism opens a short route to the denial of the need
for collective dialogue, debate and action, and an appeal, which Bentham at least might urge us to
heed, for the rehabilitation of politics, and the rediscovery of the value of that political liberty
which ‘facilitates the irreducibly collective action that is needed for its preservation’.
Angela Marciniak’s paper is a fitting response both to Laval’s initial criticism of outdated political
categories and to Stephen Engelmann’s interpretation of Liberal Paternalism as a de-politicized form
of Benthamism. Marciniak focuses on the shortcomings of current prevention theories in order to
argue for a critical re-assessment of the prevailing negativity towards the concept, and to offer a con-
tribution to reconstructing a new theory of prevention. Marciniak starts her ambitious programme
with an examination of contemporary concepts of prevention. She states that the prevention of harm
has always been one of the most important ends of governance. However, owing to the number of
fields in which prevention may be applied, and the dizzying range of techniques and policy instru-
ments used in its application, including everything from penal law to nudges, she agrees that the con-
cept is ‘slippery’. A parallel could be drawn with Quinn’s analysis of Bentham’s indirect legislation,
where he expounded on the pitfalls in deploying a political concept which could potentially cover all
forms of human conduct. Marciniak highlights the way in which the concept of prevention is either
left undefined, or carelessly equated with other competing concepts (such as risk, understood always
and everywhere as exclusively risk of negative consequences, or the precautionary principle).
Moreover, she shows that identifying the constituent elements of prevention, such as prediction
and intervention, is no panacea for the negativism associated with the concept. In this unsatisfactory
state-of-the-art, she nonetheless points to some useful typologies current in the field, such as the
distinction between upstream, midstream and downstream prevention, which she later identifies
with Bentham’s categorization of interventions as respectively prevention, cure, or compensation.
Marciniak recoils from such a forbidding depiction of the present, and sets herself the task of
exploring the creative possibilities of change. To do so, she moves on with the constructive statement
that ‘seeking to prevent harm in order to produce well-being is almost universally accepted to be a
sensible idea’, and she feels thus entitled to continue her endeavour by employing a history of ideas
perspective. In this, she is helped by Bentham’s indirect legislation, which she describes as means to
prevent the circumstances that give rise to mischief, by attending to the causes of mischievous acts.
She is quick to point out that Bentham’s conception of prevention is very broad, and that, indeed, it
encompasses everything from simple nudging to the provision of incentives and deterrents with
potentially high material costs, and that its use extends across every branch of government. This
forms the basis of her refusal to accept labels such as ‘the police state’ or ‘the preventive state’, as
they ignore the fact that all branches of government and public policies have to operate interdepen-
dently. Marciniak then explores in detail the tools Bentham uses to achieve an effective prevention of
harm, focusing more particularly on accessory offences, the role of the secondary will, and transpar-
ency. She challenges the idea that this must inevitably open wide the door to state surveillance and
political arbitrariness, quoting Sunstein’s insistence that the architecture of choice cannot be simply
wished away, so that the very idea of non-interference in individual choice is an incoherent chimera,
and the proper question is thus not one of government vs. absence of government, but of the ends
pursued by government, and the means deployed in that pursuit. Marciniak shows that indirect
legislation explicitly aims to prevent political misrule, and that, by so doing, it ensures that the indi-
vidual will not get lost in the powerful machinery of government. Bentham’s policy instruments
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against misrule included controlling the governors, publicity of parliamentary debates, periodic elec-
tions, wide suffrage, a free press, and a tribunal of public opinion, as well as the capacity to make
political representatives accountable in case of crimes and corruption.
For Bentham, security is a precondition for the enjoyment of freedom. Security is seen as a posi-
tive value and an individual good. To achieve the utilitarian aim of government, the legislator has to
provide security of expectations. This leads Marciniak to establish a distinction between risk and
security, the first being conceived in an abstract way, as a paragon of calculation, while the second
is experienceable through the pleasure of confident expectation. However, even if, in Bentham, risks
are always considered from the standpoint of calculation, he does not seek only to avoid them, but
also to embrace them, and to seek means to generate the best possible outcome. The paper ends with
a reassessment of indirect legislation, which is also a vibrant appeal for the construction of a fully
fledged theory, or theories, of prevention: ‘[Indirect legislation] is also a supreme example of the
paramount importance of developing such a conception through legitimate political procedures,
in terms of deliberating the aims, the methods and means of public policy consistently’.
The special issue closes with Malik Bozzo-Rey’s contribution, which unveils the conceptions
underlying the elusive concept of indirect legislation. He suggests that a comprehensive re-evaluation
of indirect means to influence behaviour is necessary. Contrary to the previous papers in this issue,
that place indirect legislation within contemporary debates on liberalism and prevention theories,
Bozzo-Rey takes a different perspective on Bentham’s concept, looking into the underpinnings of
this type of social regulation. His first concern is to find criteria which would make it possible for
him to distinguish indirect legislation from direct legislation.
Firstly, he points that the proper functioning of indirect legislation relies heavily on as accurate
and complete an account of human nature as possible. As a knowledge of human nature is needed
when it comes to influencing human behaviour, psychology finds itself promoted to the status of a
science of behaviours which could provide all the information necessary to ensure the efficiency of
legislation. Bozzo-Rey then explores the epistemic and evidential issues involved in relying on psy-
chology as the foundation for legislation, be it direct or indirect. Legislation in Bentham is based both
on a psychological principle, which recognizes that people pursue pleasure and try to avoid pain, and
on an attendant normative principle that they should promote the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest
number’. This description holds good for most contemporary forms of indirect means to influence
behaviour, such as nudges. Nudge theory also needs an accurate and unifying conception of human
nature. It relies on
observing and understanding how people actually behave, and how they effectively answer to incentives
(broadly conceived), whatever they are, and independently of any a priori model of rationality which purports
to explain how they would behave if they were acting rationally.
He shows how the nudge approach to human behaviour is not normative, but descriptive, highlight-
ing its reliance on the application of empirically established evidence of heuristics and biases. He
concludes the first part of his study by admitting that behavioural economics are more accurate
and global than Bentham’s psychology, but by reasserting the empirical and evidence-based
approach shared by Bentham’s utilitarianism and nudge theory. He nonetheless questions the
reliability of the psychological principles on which behavioural economics is based, since these are
often established by laboratory experiments, which are themselves potentially biased by the particu-
larities of experimental design. Bozzo-Rey raises doubts about the capacity of behavioural sciences to
provide robust evidence to support public policies.
Secondly, he investigates the criterion of temporality. On first inspection, it seems that direct
legislation tackles the offender after the commission of the offence, whereas indirect legislation
seeks to prevent the offence, and therefore operates before its commission. Bozzo-Rey nonetheless
offers a more considered approach to this apparently clear distinction. He reaffirms that the direct
and indirect legislation are interdependent, and then points out, as Quinn does in his paper, that the
same law could simultaneously belong to either direct or indirect legislation, according to its aim and
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its target, so that there could be several parties affected in different ways by one and the same law,
and finally highlights the paradoxical implication that for the deterrent example of punishment to
perform its allotted task in preventing offences, punishable offences have first to be committed.
He concludes that it is impossible to maintain a strict distinction between direct and indirect legis-
lation by an appeal to the lens of temporality. Parallel reservations apply to nudges, since the success
of a nudge in changing behaviour at time t is no guarantee that it will continue to succeed at times t +
1, t + 2, and so on. This leads Bozzo-Rey to raise the issue of the intrinsic capacity of a nudge to
change preferences in the long term, rather than only targeting behaviour expressed through an act.
Bozzo-Rey comes logically to his third point when he questions the target of policies based on
indirect legislation or nudges. Are these targets acts, circumstances, desires, or preferences? He ident-
ifies the inconsistencies of preference-change in nudge theory, and highlights the underpinnings of a
theory which, behind the imperfect human chooser, implies a perfectly rational individual who is
assumed to be able rationally to identify the general structure of her preferences and act accordingly.
Similarly, he raises the issue of how behavioural sciences can help in knowing the preferences of
individuals, when their decisions have impacts on other members of society, that is, on the prefer-
ence-sets of other affected decision-makers. In a very Benthamic spirit, Bozzo-Rey’s reaches the
conclusion that one needs to identify precisely the sets of both decision-makers and of preferences
targeted by nudging. In other words, in one sense, he calls for the nudgers to be nudged.
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